Homer’s Greeks had no inner life. That’s the title of a recent introduction to Julian Jaynes’s bicameral theory of mind. To recap: in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Jaynes argued that intelligent behavior preceded introspective consciousness. People could speak, learn, farm, build cities, and solve problems without mentally representing themselves as an “I” deliberating within an internal world.

In Jaynes’s theory, routine behavior followed habit but difficult or unfamiliar situations triggered “command hallucinations,” voices experienced as gods, ancestors, or rulers giving instructions. One part of the mind issued commands; another obeyed—hence “bicameral.” Increasing complexity, migration, and the breakdown of established authority undermined the bicameral mind. Starting around 1200 BC, roughly between the Iliad and the Odyssey, people increasingly began imagining alternatives and narrating their own actions within an internal mental space, in short, they became conscious. Consciousness was thus not a biological given but a product of cultural and linguistic evolution.

I used to dismiss Jaynes’s theory completely, The idea of otherwise normal but unconscious human beings seemed absurd. Today, I am not so sure. If you think AIs are not conscious, then a central premise of Jaynes’s theory becomes much more plausible: namely, a civilization of thinking, talking doing, but unconscious beings. The AIs are an existence proof. That said, I still find the evidence for a sharp break around the Homeric era weak. Linguistic differences between the Iliad and later texts are a weak reed for such a big claim and can be explained in other ways. The case for a near-universal transition in a few centuries is thin. On Occam’s-razor grounds I favor continuity. The fact that some animals appear conscious pushes in the same direction.

AIs also undermine Jaynes’s theory in one way. Jaynes bases part of his theory on a change in the way people spoke—moving from describing their actions in terms of following commands to describing their actions in terms of deliberation and “I.” But if AIs are not conscious, then non-conscious beings can describe what they are doing in conscious terms. Of course, AIs have human culture as a foundation, which the early non-conscious humans would not have had, so I don’t think this is a strong hit on the theory.

Still, Jaynes’s theory is that until very recently most humans lacked introspective consciousness. Does this mean that they couldn’t suffer or didn’t deserve moral consideration? I would think not, but it raises the question of what kind of consciousness are we looking for in AIs? Are AIs as conscious as Jaynes’s Achilles? If we can debate whether Homeric era humans were conscious, it’s no surprise that we have difficulty deciding whether AIs are or could be conscious.

In What Did We Learn from Torturing Babies I wrote about the era when doubts about babies’ capacity to feel pain helped justify surgery without anesthesia. Babies certainly behaved as if they felt pain, but a theory overrode the plain observations. That seems crazy if you take behavior seriously as evidence of experience—a broad Turing-test approach. But taking that approach seriously also suggests AIs might well be conscious.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Jaynes was right or wrong but the fact that there is any debate at all is telling. We don’t have a good test for consciousness whether applied to the past, to other animals, or to machines. If we are unsure whether Achilles had an inner life perhaps we should be unsure whether Claude has an inner life.

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